From: Luis Ewing at (253) 226-3741 or email@example.com
All SEIZURES of PROPERTY is an IN REM action period.
Impoundment of all motor vehicles is an IN REM action! -- We even have a Washington Statute that says right in the TEXT of the statute that the IMPOUNDMENT of your car is an IN REM action. (Cite unavailable at this time) (You go read Chapter 46.55.155 et seq. of the RCW, I don't have time!)
Divorce is also an IN REM action!
Child Custody is an IN REM action!
Child Support is an IN REM action!
Here is some Washington Case law and Federal case law cited within it that shows that IN REM is a jurisdiction granted solely to the United States District Court's EXCLUSIVE OF THE STATES that clearly states that CONGRESS NEVER GAVE ANY STATUTORY AUTHORITY to any of the "States" in Original Jurisdiction to proceed in an IN REM proceeding listed below.
Here is some cut-and-paste of some cites that I have used to get my car out of impound for FREE which scared the crap out of the judges because they do NOT want to admit that they are NOT a State Court and they do NOT want to admit that all State Courts are actually LOWER DISTRICT FEDERAL COURTS as the Session law creating the Superior Court's of Washington clearly states in both the Senate and House Bills.
This is a hot issue that State Judges do NOT want to admit!
*1. ARGUMENT: A STATE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROCEED IN REM ON THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITIES TO WIT:*
The jurisdiction of a Federal Court of Admiralty is very narrow having been established only by direct grant under the constitution of the United States. A suit in Admiralty is designed *to bring the "RES" before the court for adjudication*. The "*bottom*" is sued and is made party defendant. (Dred SCOTT was treated as a PERSON or THING and was an IN REM action.) (Emphasis added)
As recently as 1951 and 1963, the Washington State Supreme Court has stated that:
"*The remedy saved to suitors by the judiciary code is the right to proceed in personam against the defendant. The Moses Taylor, supra*. With respect to actions in rem, the applicable principle, amply supported by authorities, is stated by Benedict, as follows:
*The right to proceed in rem is the distinctive remedy of the admiralty and hence administered exclusively by the United States courts in admiralty: no State can confer jurisdiction upon its courts to proceed in rem, nor could Congress give such power to a State, since it would be contrary to the constitutional grant of such power to the Federal Government*. The saving clause of the Judiciary Act and of the Judicial Code does not contemplate admiralty in a common law court." 1 Benedict on Admiralty (6th ed.) 38, section 23.
Our examination of the authorities leads us to subscribe to the above-quoted views of Benedict.
. . . Moreover, the broad language of the opinion in one of these cases, Taylor v. Steamer Columbia (California), to the effect *that the states have the power to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon their own courts, was expressly disavowed in the later California case of Fischer v. Carey, supra*. In another of these cited cases, The Alcalde, supra, the Federal court specifically refused to pass upon the question of whether the state trial court had erred in appointing a receiver to take legal custody of the vessel.
Appellants, being minority owners, are here confronted with an admiralty principle which prevents them from obtaining, in an admiralty court, the desired sale of the vessel for partition. They seek to circumvent that obstacle by applying to the state court for relief, and point to the saving clause above referred to as permitting this recourse.
The fundamental purpose of Art. III, section 2, of the Federal constitution was to "preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime matters and bring them within the control of the Federal Government." Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 64 L.Ed. 834, 40 S. Ct. 438, 11 A.L.R. 1145. The saving clause was never intended as a device whereby litigants could escape the uniform application of the established principles of admiralty law, as contemplated by the constitution. This is indicated by such decisions as Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 37 S. Ct. 524; Chelentis v. Luckenbach, S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384, 62 L.Ed. 1171, 38 S. Ct. 501; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra; and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 68 L.Ed. 646, 44 S. Ct. 302 (affirming 122 Wash. 572).
...And in the Knickerbocker case, it was said, quoting the early case of The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 22 L. Ed. 654:
"'That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States cannot be doubted. . . . One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. *It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States**, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states*.'" (pp. 160-161.)
* We therefore conclude that the courts of this state do not have jurisdiction, concurrent or otherwise, over the particular kind of action stated in appellant's amended complaint*.
The judgment is affirmed.
MALLERY, HILL, FINLEY, and OLSON, JJ., concur."
CLINE v. PRICE, 39 Wn.2d 816, 821, 822, 823 (December 27, 1951.)*
"*THE DISTRICT COURTS SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION, EXCLUSIVE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATES, OF:*
"*(1) ANY CIVIL CASE OF ADMIRALTY* or maritime jurisdiction, savings to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C.A. section 1333(1)." *SCUDERO v. TODD SHIPYARDS CORP., 63 Wn.2d 46 at 48 [No 36319. En Banc. October 10, 1963.] *
It is clear the Constitution of the United States (Art. 3, Sec. 2, Clause 1) expressly provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "all cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction;" and the Federal Judiciary Act, while it gives to the Federal Courts exclusive original cognizance over civil cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction, saves to suitors the right of the common law remedy in all cases where the common law is competent to give it."
The following quotation from Knapp, Stout and Company vs. McCaffery, 178 Ill. 107, 69 Am. St. Rep. 290 at page 299, well illustrates the distinction between an Admiralty suit and a suit in equity for an accounting:
"*The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to administer relief by proceeding in rem in Admiralty is unquestionably exclusive. Such proceeding, however, is against the property only.* The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such suit is, that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is judges and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of a suit in Admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives the title made under its decree validity against all the world.
(Citing The Moses Taylor, 4 WALL. 411). No person is a defendant in such a suit. Parties who have real or personal interests determine for themselves whether they will appear and protect their interests. When a sale is made in such a proceeding, it is good against the whole world. No such remedy was sought here. This was a suit against persons. No one would be bound by decree herein except those made parties. A sale, though purporting to be of the property, would really be only a sale of the interests of the defendants therein. A personal decree for the deficiency, if any, might follow. The equitable circumstances before mentioned, growing out of the sale and assignment, a denial of possession, intention to seize the property, the duty of McCaffery to protect it from a rise of the river, and the obstacles to so doing put in his way by the Knapp Company, all furnish ground for equitable cognizance. We cannot hold that because a proceeding against the raft in Admiralty might afford some conflict, therefore a court of equity must keep its hand off, if equitable circumstances exist which justify its granting relief on well established equitable principles against persons made defendants. Moreover, if the case had any likeness to a suit in rem in Admiralty when it was started, it lost that distinctive character when the Knapp Company at its own request, took the raft and left a personal bond in its place. Thereafter the suit was wholly in personam." Citing Johnson vs. The Chicago Etc. Elevator Company, 119 U.S. 388, Gindele vs. Corrigan, 28 Ill. App. 476, 129 Ill. 582, 16 Am. St. Rep. 292."
Furthermore, our State Supreme Court has disclaimed any jurisdiction over maritime torts. *West v. Martin, 47 Wash. 417, 92 Pac. 334.*
HOLY MOLEY BATMAN! If this so called State Court is really a State Court, then it has NO jurisdiction to conduct an IN REM proceeding over the seizure of any of my private property or my car and they have to let me get my car out of impound for FREE -- and I have done it several times, ha, ha, ha, to the red faced judge who did NOT want to go there!
No State Court Judge wants to reach the question, "...is this so called State Court really a Lower District Federal Court and NOT really a State Court in Original Jurisdiction?"
Just go look at the 1st Judiciary Act of 1792 where the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is NOT listed as a State on an equal footing with the 50 States!
"The State of Washington" is NOT the same as "STATE OF WASHINGTON."
Look up the word "THE" and the significance when you place "the" before another word or series of words!
Now go look at the NEW JUDICIARY ACT where you now see that the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is now on an EQUAL FOOTING with the 50 CORPORATE STATES which are all UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS that ALL have FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBERS!
Gee when did we ever make THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA A STATE?
If the NEW JUDICARY ACT shows that the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is now on an equal footing with the 50 CORPORATE STATES, what kind of STATES are these NEW 50 STATES and how are they different from the 50 States under the 1st JUDICIARY ACT OF 1792?
If STATE OF WASHINGTON was really a "State", why does it have a FEDERAL TAX ID (TIN) NUMBER? (See for yourself, request it via an open records request.)
If one Sovereign cannot tax another Sovereign, why is FICA & SOCIAL SECURITY being withheld from the so called STATE JUDGES PAYCHECKS?
If CONGRESS never gave authority by the Constitution or any Statute to any of the so called STATE COURTS, how then do the city cops, county sheriffs and State Patrol in all the States get away with seizing your car for the so called STATE COURTS to conduct an IN REM proceeding over the IMPOUNDMENT OF YOUR CAR?
This is just the TIP of the FEDERAL ICEBURG!
Sorry I don't have time to elaborate further.
But yes, MARITIME TORTS must be brought in to a Federal Court, however, other Admiralty cases have been brought onto the land and they can do this in all the courts in all the TERRITORIES & POSSESSIONS which is what the 50 CORPORATE STATES REALLY ARE!
There are NO States in Original Jurisdiction IN EXISTENCE TODAY - period!
All so called STATES are really TERRITORIES & POSSESSION in FACT and LAW and I can prove it!